Most of the previous cryptographic work in privacy-preserving data mining suggest solutions in the semi-honest model. Semi-honest model assumes that participating parties follows the prescribed protocol but try to infer private information using the messages they receive during the protocol. Although semi-honest model is realistic in many settings, there are cases where it may be better to use the "malicious model" which tries to prevent any malicious behavior by using more expensive cryptographic techniques. Clearly, protocols that are secure in the malicious model provide more security compared to the ones in the semi-honest model. At the same time, there is an obvious trade-off: malicious model that provides higher security guarantees with higher computational cost versus more efficient semi-honest model with less security guarantees. In this paper, our goal is to analyze the relative cost of privacy-preserving data mining algorithms in both models to see their difference in performance. In order to make a realistic comparison, we first provide the "malicious" versions of the commonly used semi-honest subprotocols in privacy-preserving data mining and compare the performance of these protocols in both models.
Introduction
Data needed for many crucial data mining tasks is distributed among different parties with different security and privacy concerns. For example, different credit card companies may need to combine their data sets to build a better credit card fraud detection system. In many of these distributed data mining settings, the revelation of the original data sets are not acceptable due to privacy concerns. For example, credit card companies may not be willing to share their data sets directly, due to the fact that, those data sets may reveal valuable competitive information. In order to address this problem, many privacy-preserving data mining protocols that use cryptographic techniques have been suggested. (Please read Section 2.1 for the detailed discussion of the previous work) In the semi-honest model, each party follows the protocol without any deviation and adversaries behave in a semi-honest fashion; which may be a valid assumption for many different scenarios. For example, in the case of credit cart companies, semi-honest behavior may be reasonable because of several reasons: First of all, companies may not want to take the risk of learning an incorrect result due to malicious behavior (i.e., due to deviating from the prescribed protocol). Also, if they caught cheating during or after the execution of the protocol, this may jeopardize their future relations with the other companies. Nevertheless, semi-honest assumption may not be enough in some certain settings. For example, different nations that cooperate to learn data mining models for terrorist detection may not trust each other completely. In this case, they may prefer to use the protections of the malicious model.
However, the cost trade-off between the protocols in the malicious model and the semihonest model is not clear in practice. We believe that giving a detailed analysis of the corresponding costs could be a valuable tool for decision makers. Since there are many different privacy-preserving data mining algorithms in practice, it is not feasible to make every one of them secure in the malicious model for comparison purposes. Instead, we focus on the common subprotocols that are used in privacy-preserving data mining and modify them to be secure in the malicious model. Since many data mining algorithms make use of these subprotocols in different fashions, information about the relative cost of implementing any given subprotocol in the malicious model could be used to give a precise estimate of the total cost of the privacy-preserving data mining algorithm in the malicious model. For the reasons stated above, we analyzed the costs of secure equality, secure dot product and secure set operations protocols in the malicious model. In this paper, we focus on the two-party protocols and leave the extension for the multi-party case as a future work.
Our Contributions
We provide two-party secure protocols in the malicious model for equality, dot product and full domain set operations. For dot product, we provide two different protocols: the first protocol is a straightforward extension of the semi-honest version and the second protocol is a secure protocol in the malicious that provides a more efficient way than the first one. These initial results indicate that for efficiency purposes, we may want to fully redesign the protocols in the malicious model, instead of directly converting the semi-honest protocols using zero-knowledge proofs. We also provide extensive experimental analysis of the given protocols.
Organization of the Paper
In section 2, we discuss the necessary background information in privacy-preserving data mining and secure multi-party computations. In section 3, we provide secure subprotocols in the malicious model along with their security analysis. In section 4, we compare the relative efficiency of each protocol both in the semi-honest and the malicious model. Finally, we conclude the paper with the discussions of the current results and the future work.
Background
In this section, we first discuss the previous work done in privacy-preserving data mining. Later on, we provide the necessary cryptographic definitions and tools used in this paper.
Related Work
Many different distributed privacy-preserving data mining algorithms were implemented using cryptographic techniques. Usually two different assumptions about the distribution of the data are used in those protocols. In the horizontally partitioned data, it is assumed that different sites collect the same set of information about different entities. For example, different credit card companies may collect credit card transactions of different individuals. Secure protocols for mining decision trees [1] , association rules [2] , k-means clusters [3] , k-nn classifiers [4] and many other models have been developed for the horizontally partitioned data.
In the vertically partitioned case, it is assumed that different sites collect information about the same set of entities but they collect different feature sets. For example, both a university and a hospital may collect information about a student. Again, secure protocols for the vertically partitioned case have been developed for mining association rules [5] , decision trees [6] and k-means clusters [7] .
In several recent studies, all of those previous protocols were proven to be secure in the semi-honest model. Instead, in this paper, we focus on the security issues in the malicious model and provide the malicious versions of the subprotocols used in the previous privacypreserving data mining algorithms.
Cryptographic Background
Our definition of privacy-preserving data mining implies that nothing other than the final data mining result is revealed during the data mining process. This definition is equivalent to the "security" definition used in secure multiparty computation (SMC) literature.
In this section, we give an overview of the cryptographic definitions and techniques that are used in this paper.
Security in Malicious Model
In order to provide proofs of security, we need to provide an exact definition of security first. Since this is a well studied subject in SMC domain, we directly follow the security definitions given in the literature. In our analysis, we assume that a malicious (i.e., active) adversary can only corrupt the same (and one) party during the entire protocol. In other words, we only deal with active, static adversaries. As mentioned in the introduction section, we focus on only two-party protocols. Therefore, we modify the definitions given in [8] for two-party case.
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Below, we first introduce the execution of the protocol in the real-life model and then define the execution of the protocol in the ideal model. Finally, we define the security as emulating the real-life execution of a protocol in the ideal model. Definition 2.1. The Real-Life Model [8] Let π be a two-party protocol where each party P i has a secret input x s i and a public input x p i . Also each P i returns a private output y s i and a public output y p i after the execution of the protocol. Let A be the adversary that can corrupt any one (and only one) party during the execution of the protocol. Let
2 ) be the participating parties input, let r = (r 1 , r 2 , r A ) be the random inputs of the parties and the adversary, let C ∈ 1, 2 be the index of the corrupted party, and let z ∈ {0, 1} * be the auxiliary input. Also let k be the security parameter. We denote the output of the adversary after the execution of the protocol as ADV R π,A (k, x, C, z, r) and similarly the output of the party P i as
Also we denote the EXEC π,A (k, x, C, z) be the random variable for a uniformly chosen r. Finally, we define a distribution ensemble EXEC π,A with security parameter k which is indexed by ( x, C, z) as :
4 be a probabilistic two-party function computable in probabilistic polynomial time. We define the output of f as f (k, x
where k is the security parameter and r is the random input. In the ideal model, parties send their inputs to an incorruptible trusted party which draws r uniformly random, computes f and returns the party P i its output value (y 
denote the collection of the the outputs and IDEAL f,S is the distribution ensemble indexed by ( x, C, z).
Definition 2.3. Security in the Static Malicious Adversary Setting [8] Let f be a two-party function and let π be a protocol for two parties. We say that π securely evaluate f in the static setting if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, there exists an ideal-model adversary S whose running time is polynomial in the running time of A, and such that
where C ≈ denotes the computational indistinguishability between two ensembles.
Basically, security in this model implies that given any adversary in the real-life model we can emulate an adversary in the ideal model that has computationally indistinguishable outputs. Therefore, in the security proofs, we will define an ideal model adversary S that runs any given real-life adversary A as a subroutine in a black-box fashion and we will show that their views are computationally indistinguishable.
We also need to combine several secure function evaluations to create new protocols. In order to prove that the composed protocol is secure, we first show that the composed protocol is secure given oracle access to the needed functions. Later on, using the theorems stated in [10] , we can replace the oracle calls with the real-life protocols without violating security. In order to formalize the above intuition, we first define the hybrid model: Similar to the security definition given above, we define the security in the hybrid model by requiring that for any adversary operating in the hybrid model, there exists an adversary S in the ideal model such that
As mentioned before, we can replace the oracle calls to function h i with its secure implementation in the real-life model without sacrificing security. Please refer to [11] for details.
Homomorphic Encryption
Many subprotocols used in privacy-preserving data mining algorithms such as secure log(x) [12] , set operations [13] , secure dot product [7] protocols use homomorphic encryption. In order to provide a fair comparison, we also utilize secure homomorphic public key cryptosystem in our solutions against malicious adversaries.
Let E pk (.) denote the encryption function with public key pk and D pr (.) denote the decryption function with private key pr. A secure public key cryptosystem is called homomorphic if it satisfies the following requirements: (1) Given the encryption of m 1 and m 2 , E pk (m 1 ) and E pk (m 2 ), there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the public key encryp-
(2) Given a constant k and the encryption of m 1 , E pk (m 1 ), there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the public key encryption of
For the sake of completeness, we provide a brief defintion of the homomorphic cryptosystem that we use in our experiments. Please refer to [14] for details. Paillier cryptosystem, which is based on composite residuosity assumption satisfies the above properties and can be defined as follows:
• Key Generation: Let p and q are prime numbers where p < q and p does not divide q − 1. For the Paillier encryption scheme, we set the public key pk to n where n = pq and private key pr to (λ, n) where λ is the lowest common multiplier of p − 1, q − 1.
• Encryption with the Public Key: Given n, the message m, and a random number r from 1 to n − 1, encryption of the message m can be calculated as follows: E pk (m) = (1 + n) m r n mod n 2 . Also note that given any encrypted message, we can get a different encryption by multiplying it with some random r n .
• Decryption with the Private Key: Given n, the cipher text c = E pk (m), we can calculate the D pr (c) as follows: m = (c λ mod n 2 )−1 n λ −1 mod n where λ −1 is the inverse of λ in modulo n.
• Adding Two Ciphertexts (+ h ): Given the encryption of m 1 and m 2 , E pk (m 1 ) and E pk (m 2 ), we can calculate the E pk (m 1 + m 2 ) as follows:
We would like to emphasize that this addition will actually return E pk (m 1 +m 2 mod n).
• Multiplying a Ciphertext with a Constant (k × h E pk (m 1 )): Given a constant k and the encryption of m 1 ,E pk (m 1 ), we can calculate k × h E pk (m 1 ) as follows:
In our solutions, which are secure against malicious adversaries, we use a slightly different version of the homomorphic encryption described above. Also, we use efficient zeroknowledge protocols in random oracle model to prove that the actions taken by the parties are correct without revealing any other information. We briefly summarize those protocols below. The implementation details of those protocols for Paillier encryption can be found in [14, 8] .
• Threshold Decryption (two-party case): Given the common public key pk, the private key pr corresponding to pk has been divided into two pieces pr 0 and pr 1 .
There exists an efficient, secure protocol D pr i (E pk (a)) such that it outputs the random share of the decryption result s i along with the non-interactive zero knowledge proof P OD(pr i , E pk (a), s i ) showing that pr i used correctly. Those shares can be combined to calculate the decryption result. Also any single share of the private key pr i cannot be used to decrypt the ciphertext alone. In other words s i does not reveal anything about the final decryption result. We also use the special version of the threshold decryption such that only one party learns the decryption result. Such protocol could be easily implemented by using the fact that for any given E pk (a), the party that needs to learn the decryption result could generate E pk (r1) and then both parties jointly decrypt the E pk (a) + h E pk (r1). Since only one party knows the r1, that party can learn the correct decryption result.
• Proving that you know a plaintext: A party P i can compute the zero knowledge proof P OK(e a ) where he shows that he knows an element a in the domain of valid plaintexts such that D pr (e a ) = a.
• Proving that multiplication is correct: Assume that party P i is given an encryption E pk (a) and chooses constant c and calculates E pk (a.c). Later on, P i can give zero knowledge proof P OM C(e a , e c , e a.c ) such that D pr (e a ) = D pr (a) and
In our security proofs, we use the simulators for the above zero-knowledge proofs guaranteed due to their security properties. As discussed in [8] , those simulators return a state of the adversary that is statistically indistinguishable from the state of the adversary in the real-life execution. Also, those simulators return the secret inputs used by the adversary for valid zero-knowledge proofs with overwhelming probability. We use both of these properties in our security proofs.
Secure Protocols in Malicious Model
All the protocols mentioned in this section are implemented in semi-honest model as primitives for different privacy-preserving data mining algorithms. Here we summarize these basic sub-protocols and provide ways to make them secure in malicious model by using efficient zero-knowledge proofs given above.
Secure Equality Protocol
One of the most common tools needed in many privacy-preserving data mining algorithms is to calculate whether two items are equal or not without revealing these items. Such secure equality protocol could easily be implemented using homomorphic encryption in semi-honest model without using threshold decryption. The idea is simple. P 0 generates a homomorphic key pair and send the pk to P 1 along with the item E pk (x 0 ). Given pk, P 1 calculates E pk (−1.(x 1 )) where x 1 is the P 1 's item. After that P 1 calculates e = (E pk (−1.
where r is a random number and send e to P 0 . Clearly if x 0 = x 1 then D pr (e) = 0 else it is a random number. Although the above protocol is correct in semi-honest model, it does not work in malicious model where P 1 uses a r = 0 to make the decryption 0 any time he wants.
We can develop an equality protocol that is secure in the malicious model using the threshold version of the homomorphic encryption for two-party case. Basic idea in the malicious version is that two parties jointly calculate E pk ((x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 )) where r 0 , r 1 are random numbers chosen by the respective parties. Here at each step, using the zero knowledge protocols described above, P 0 and P 1 prove that the actions they have taken are consistent with the protocol without revealing anything.
In this protocol, each party sends the encrypted x i value to the other party. Since each party only has the share of the private key, they cannot decrypt the other party's encrypted x i value. Later on using the homomorphic encryption, each party calculates E pk ((x 0 − x 1 )r i ) and proves to the other party that the calculation is correct. After that each party calculates E pk ((x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 )) and jointly decrypts E pk ((x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 )) to learn (x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 ). Clearly if the decrypted value is zero with very high probability x 0 = x 1 else it means that x 0 = x 1 . The details of the secure equality protocol in malicious model is given in Protocol 1. Please note that we use an oracle call to do threshold decryption, instead of actual implementation. As stated before, such oracle calls could be replaced with actual secure implementation.
We can easily prove that the above protocol is secure in malicious model. More specifically, Theorem 3.1. Protocol 1 is secure in the (decryption)-hybrid model assuming that the noninteractive zero-knowledge protocols used are secure in the malicious model.
Proof. (Sketch)
Here we give an outline of the proof by skipping a few technical details. In order to prove the security of the protocol, for any adversary A operating in the hybrid model, we need to define an adversary S A operating in the real-life model such that the views of the both adversaries are computationally indistinguishable. In order to define such S A , we will use A as a subroutine. Before the simulation starts, S A will be given the description of the A, private input of the corrupted party x 0 , 2 the final result of the equality test b, public key pk and the private key of the P 1 . Now we can define the S A as follows:
1. Run A to get E pk (x 0 ) along with the P OK(e x 0 ) 2. Run the simulator S P OK by giving the current state of the A and E pk (x 0 ) as an input to S P OK . If the simulator of the proof fails terminate the protocol, else set the state of A returned by the S P OK
Choose non-zero random r i and calculate
Check whether the e x 0 −x 1 send by P 1−i is correct else ABORT Check whether P OK(e r 1−i ) is valid else ABORT Check whether P OM C(e x 0 −x 1 , e r 1−i , e (x 0 −x 1 )r 1−i ) valid else ABORT Calculate e (x 0 −x 1 )(r 0 +r 1 ) = e (x 0 −x 1 )r 1 + h e (x 0 −x 1 )r 0 end for for all P i do Jointly use the trusted party T to get D pr (e (x 0 −x 1 )(r 0 +r 1 ) ) if (x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 ) = 0 then return 1 else return 0 end if end for 3. If b is 1 then feed A with E pk (x 0 ) else feed A with E pk (r a ) for some random r a = x 0 along with the correct zero-knowledge proof. Let x S A be the plaintext value given to A in this step.
4. Run S P OCM to simulate the zero-knowledge proof and set the state of A by the state returned by the S P OCM . If the proof fails terminate. Also feed the A with the correct zero-knowledge proof for the encrypted value given to A in the previous state.
5. Get the e (x 0 −x S A )(r 0 +r 1 ) for the oracle call to Decrypt function and gives A a random number if b = 0 else gives 0 6. S A outputs whatever A outputs.
We now need to prove that the view of S A is computationally indistinguishable from the execution in the hybrid-model. First note that until step 2, the view of the A in the simulation is statistically indistinguishable to the view of A in the hybrid-model. Security of the zeroknowledge guarantees that on computationally indistinguishable inputs, the output state of the zero-knowledge proof simulator is identical to state of A in the hybrid protocol. With the similar arguments, we can say that the state of A before the step 5 is identical to the state in the hybrid model. Now we need to show that the result returned by the decryption call in the simulation is statistically indistinguishable than the one seen by the A in the actual implementation. If b = 1, then in the both executions, A will be given 0, if b = 0 than in the simulation, A can see any value with equal probability, in the hybrid-model execution A will get (x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 ). Since r 1 is random, the probability that (x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 ) equals to zero is negligibly small in terms of security parameter. Also (x 0 − x 1 )(r 0 + r 1 ) is distributed uniformly distributed in Z * n assuming that all operation are modulo n. Therefore the state of A after the step 5 is the same in both executions. This concludes our proof.
Secure Dot Product
Secure Dot product is an another useful subprotocol that is commonly used in many privacypreserving data mining algorithms. Using homomorphic encryption, it is straightforward to develop a secure dot product protocol in the semi-honest model. Similarly, P 0 generates a homomorphic key pair and send the pk to P 1 along with the encrypted vector E pk (x 0 ) = (E pk (x 00 ), E pk (x 01 ), . . . , E pk (x 0n )). Given pk, P 1 calculates ex 0 .
) where x 1i is the P 1 's vector's i th component and sends ex 0 .x 1 + h E pk (r 1 ) to P 0 . By decrypting the P 1 's message, P 0 learns the random share of the dot product resultx 0 .x 1 + r 1 . Clearly P 0 and P 1 can combine their shares to learnx 0 .x 1 . Now we show how to evaluate the dot product in malicious model for two-party case securely using threshold homomorphic encryption. We provide two different secure dot product protocols that can be used in the malicious model. The first protocol given in Section 3.2.1 is a generic extension of the semi-honest protocol described above using appropriate zeroknowledge proofs. Later on, in Section 3.2.2, we show ways to provide a solution that is more efficient than the straightforward extension version. Our second dot product protocol can also be seen as an example where more efficient protocols can be developed instead of using generic transformation techniques to convert semi-honest protocols to malicious protocols.
Converting Secure Dot protocol in Semi-Honest Model to Malicious Model
If we look at the semi-honest dot product protocol carefully, we need to make sure that the P 1 does the multiplications correctly and all the encryptions sent are valid. These could be easily achieved using the zero knowledge protocols described in Section 2.2.2. P 0 sends the encrypted values along with the associated proof of correct encryption to P 1 . For each multiplication, P 1 generates the zero knowledge proof of correct multiplication and send those to P 0 . P 0 can check those proofs to make sure that dot product calculated correctly. The details are described in Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 Secure Dot Product in Malicious Model Using Threshold Decryption: Extension of the semi-honest version Require: Two parties P 0 and P 1 with the shares pr 0 and pr 1 of the private key pr and n bit vectorsx i wherex i belongs to P i . Ensure: Return r 0 = n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 to P 0 and r 1 to P 1 for P 0 do ∀i, set e x 0i = E pk (x 0i ) and create P OK(e x 0i ) Send encryptions and non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to P 1 end for for P 1 do ∀i, check whether P OK(e x 0i ) is correct else ABORT ∀i, calculate e x 1i = E pk (x 1i ), e x 0i .x 1i = e x 0i × h x 1i Calculate e r 1 = E pk (r 1 ) and P OK(e r 1 ) Calculate E pk ( n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 ) = e x 00 .x 10 + h e x 01 .x 11 + h . . . + h e x 0n .x 1n + h e r 1 Calculate e s = E pk ( n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 ) ∀i, send e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i , P OK(e x 1i ), P OM C(e x 0i , e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i ), e r 1 , P OK(e r 1 ), and e s to P 0 end for for P 0 do ∀i, check whether the P OK(e x 1i ) is correct else ABORT ∀i, check whether the P OM C(e x 0i , e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i ) is correct else ABORT Calculate e s = E pk ( n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 ) end for Jointly, call private decrypt function such that only P 0 learns the decryption of e s As before we prove the security of the protocol in malicious model. Proof. (Sketch) Again, for any adversary A operating in the hybrid model, we need to find an adversary S A operating in the ideal model. In order to simplify our simulator, let us describe S A for two different cases where either P 0 or P 1 is corrupted. First let us assume that A controls P 0 , we can define S A as follows:
1. S A gets the final result n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 as input 2. S A uses the simulator S P OK for each x 0i input sequentially.
3 If any one of the proofs terminate then S A terminates also.
3. S A sets the state of A returned by the last run of S P OK 4. S A simulates the honest P 1 by constructing the required correct zero knowledge proofs.
Feeds A with those proofs.
5. S A simulates the joint call to private decrypt function by returning n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 to A 6. S A outputs whatever A outputs Please note that the state of the A after the last execution of S P OK is identical in both worlds. Since zero knowledge proofs seen by the A that are given by S A for simulating the correct behavior of P 1 are encrypted using a semantically secure encryption, the view of A in both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, the state of A before the oracle call to private decrypt function should be identical. Since S A gives the correct result to A, the outputs in both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable. Now let us assume that P 1 is corrupted, the construction of S A is very similar to the case where P 0 is corrupted. Only the order of execution of simulators S P OK and S P OCM are different. We omit the further details here.
Secure and Efficient Dot Product for Malicious Model
In the previous secure dot protocol, P 1 is required to prove that each multiplication that it computes is correct. Actually, all we need to do is to check whether the final result is correct (i.e., whether r o is calculated correctly). Also if both parties are malicious, we do not care whether the privacy of any party is protected or parties get correct results. Assuming at least one party will behave in a semi-honest fashion (other party can do any malicious act), we can give a more efficient protocol. Please note that the assumption that at least one party is semi-honest is given in the definitions of the malicious model. Therefore, using this fact do not reduce the security guarantees provided by the malicious model. Assuming at least one party is semi-honest, it can be assured that r 0 = n i=0 (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 is evaluated correctly by at least one party. Please note that both P 0 and P 1 has enough information to calculate r 0 . If both P 0 and P 1 calculate the same r 0 value then calculations must be correct, because at least one of them is semi-honest and calculates correct r 0 . Therefore, if we securely make sure that both parties calculate the same value, then either of the local calculations could be decrypted to reveal r 0 to P 0 . In our second protocol, firstly each party sends the encrypted inputs along with the knowledge of plaintext proofs to each other, then each party P i locally computes its respective e r i 0 = E pk (r i 0 ). After that point, they use a slightly modified version of the equality protocol to check whether D pr (e r 0 0 ) = D pr (e r 1 0 ) or not. If they tend to be equal, both parties jointly decrypt one of it to reveal r 0i to reveal r 0 to P 0 . Clearly, in this version, we do not need to send expensive zero-knowledge proof of correct multiplications for every multiplication. Since both sides can calculate the e r 0i values in parallel, the following protocol can offer huge savings where the vectors used for the dot product has many components.
We provide the details of the efficient secure dot product function in Protocol 3.
Protocol 3 Secure Dot Product in Malicious Model Using Threshold Decryption: Efficient dot product Specific Version Require: Two parties P 0 and P 1 with the shares pr 0 and pr 1 of the private key pr and n bit vectorsx i wherex i belongs to P i . Ensure: Return r 0 = n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 to P 0 and r 1 to P 1 for all P i do ∀j, set e x ij = E pk (x ij ) and create P OK(e x ij ) Send encryptions and non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to P 1−i end for for P 0 do ∀i, check whether the P OK(e x 1i ) is correct else ABORT Check whether P OK(e r 1 ) is correct else ABORT Set e r 0 0 to E pk ( n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 ) = e x 00 .x 10 + h e x 01 .x 11 + h . . . + h e x 0n .x 1n + h e r 1 end for for P 1 do ∀i, check whether the P OK(e x 1i ) is correct else ABORT Check whether P OK(e r 1 ) is correct else ABORT Set e r 1 0 to E pk ( n i (x 0i .x 1i ) + r 1 ) = e x 00 .x 10 + h e x 01 .x 11 + h . . . + h e x 0n .x 1n + h e r 1 end for Jointly call decrypt equality protocol to check whether D pr (e As before, we prove the security of the protocol in malicious model. Proof. (Sketch) Without loss of generality, let us assume that real-world adversary A controls P 0 . Again for any real-world adversary A, we define a simulator S A such that output of the adversary is computationally indistinguishable in both worlds. Again, let us assume that S A is given the output of the protocol. Now we can define the S A as follows:
1. S A runs S P OK to verify the zero knowledge proofs and set A to the state returned by S P OK .
2. Use the properties of S P OK to learn the x 0i values 4 with overwhelming probability. If S P OK does not return the x 0i values then abort.
3. Generate random x 1i and r 1 values such that the dot product result is consistent with the one given to S A .
4. Feed A with the correct zero knowledge proofs for all E pk (x 1i ) and E pk (r 1 ).
5. Calculate the correct encrypted value e r 1 0 .
6. Get the input from the A for secure equality protocol.
7. Run the simulator for the secure equality protocol with the correct inputs.
8. Set the state of A to the state returned by the secure equality protocol simulator 9. If the both inputs are equal then return the correct result to A after the private decrypt call else abort.
10. Output whatever A outputs.
We need to show that the output of the A in the both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable. First note that, since A only sees the encrypted x 1i values, the state of A after Step 5 is identical, otherwise A could be used as distinguisher for homomorphic encryption. Since the inputs to the simulator for secure equality is computationally indistinguishable in both worlds, the state of A after the Step 8 is identical. Finally before the last step, the input given to A in the both worlds are the same and states are identical. Therefore, the output of A in both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable. Again the simulator for the case where A controls P 1 is similar. Therefore, we omit the discussion of that case.
Secure Set Operations
Secure set operations using homomorphic encryption have been proposed in the literature earlier in [15] . Recently Dawn et. al. also showed how to use homomorphic encryption and the zero knowledge proofs for constructing secure set operation protocols in the malicious model [13] . Given that P 0 has n items and P 1 has m items, the protocols described in [13] require O(nm) homomorphic encryptions and zero knowledge proof of correct multiplications. Although those protocols are quite efficient if the total item domain size D of the items is much bigger than the number of items possessed by P 0 and P 1 (i.e., D > n.m). For the cases where both m and n are bigger than O( (D)) or where n or m equal to D, we suggest using simple secure set intersection and set union protocols that are secure in malicious model. Our algorithms require O(D) homomorphic encryptions and zero knowledge proof of correct multiplications. The main idea is that we can represent the sets owned by each party as a bit vector size D and use secure multiplication property of the homomorphic encryption and associated zero knowledge proof to give secure set protocols in malicious model. Let us assume that x 0i is set to 1 if P 0 has item i in its private set else it is set to 0.(similarly for x 1i for P 1 ) Clearly for calculating set intersection, we need to calculate x 0i ∧ x 1i for each i. Similarly, for set union , we need to calculate x 0i ∨ x 1i for all i. Note that ∧ operation is just a multiplication. For set union, we can rewrite x 0i ∨ x 1i as ¬(¬x 0i ∧ ¬x 1i ). This implies that if (¬x 0i ∧ ¬x 1i ) is equal to zero then item i is in the set union. Therefore, we can use the multiplication protocol for set union too. The details of the set intersection protocol is given in Protocol4. The same protocol can be used for two-party set union using ¬x 0i and ¬x 1i as the input values and negating the output bits. We can easily prove that the above protocol is secure in the malicious model. More specifically, Proof. (Sketch) Again, we need to prove that for any given adversary A operating in the hybrid model, we can simulate its actions in the ideal world. The S A operating in the ideal world, is very similar to the one given in the proof sketch of the Theorem 3.2. First let us assume that A controls P 0 , we can define S A as follows:
1. S A gets the final results for all I i values 2. S A uses the simulator S P OK for each x 0i input sequentially. If any one of the proofs terminate then S A terminates also.
3. S A sets the state of A returned by the last run of S P OK 4. S A simulates the honest P 1 by constructing the correct zero knowledge proofs that are required. Feeds A with those proofs.
5. S A simulates the joint call to private decrypt function by returning the correct I i values for all i.
S A outputs whatever A outputs
Please note that the state of the A after the last execution of S P OK is identical in both worlds. Since zero knowledge proofs seen by the A that are given by S A for simulating the
Protocol 4 Secure Set Intersection in Malicious Model Using Threshold Decryption
Require: Two parties P 0 and P 1 with the shares pr 0 and pr 1 of the private key pr and input bit vectors size D where x ij is set to one if P i has item j Ensure: Return D bit vector I that represents the set intersection where I i is set to one if item i is in the set intersection.
for P 0 do ∀i, set e x i0 = E pk (x 0i ) and create P OK(e x 0i ) to prove that each x 0i is either zero or one Send encryptions and non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to P 1 end for for P 1 do ∀i, check whether P OK(e x 0i ) is correct else ABORT ∀i, x 1i calculate e x 1i = E pk (x 1i ), e x 0i .x 1i = e x 0i × h x 1i ∀i, send e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i , P OK(e x 1i ) (again proving x 1i is either zero or one), and P OM C(e x 0i , e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i ) to P 0 end for for P 0 do ∀i, check whether the P OK(e x 1i ) is correct else ABORT ∀i, check whether the P OM C(e x 0i , e x 1i , e x 0i .x 1i ) is correct else ABORT end for ∀i, jointly call threshold decryption function to learn D pr (e x 0i .x 1i ). set I i to D pr (e x 0i .x 1i ). correct behavior of P 1 are encrypted using a semantically secure encryption, the view of A in both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, the state of A before the oracle calls to private decrypt function should be identical. Since S A gives the correct result to A, the outputs in both worlds should be computationally indistinguishable.
Since the case where A controls the P 1 is similar. We omit the simulator for that case.
Secure Comparison
Secure comparison is an another important subprotocol that is commonly used in many different privacy-preserving data mining protocols. Since the most efficient protocols follow the generic circuit evaluation methods, generic conversion techniques could be used for creating secure comparison in the malicious model. Please refer to [11] for more details.
Performance Comparison
In this section, we analyze the efficiency loss of privacy-preserving data mining algorithms caused by malicious model. As stated before, the efficiency of a distributed data mining algorithm can be estimated in terms of the primitives it utilizes; i.e. number of secure dot products, secure comparisons, etc. Therefore, in the performance evaluation section we explore the efficiency trade-offs in these basic sub-protocols and use these results to estimate the possible overall slow down in privacy-preserving distributed data mining algorithms in malicious model.
Secure Dot Product
Efficiency of the secure dot product protocol is highly dependent on the size of the input dataset. On the other hand, it is not mainly effected by the length of the key that is used in the protocol [16] . Here, in order to evaluate the effect of using malicious mode on the secure dot product protocol we implement the model that is introduced in Section III-B and compare it with secure dot product protocol in semi-honest model in Figure 1 . We also implement the extended version of this model which provides an efficient way of computing secure dot product in malicious model. As it can be observed from Figure 1 , there is a significant difference between running times of secure dot product protocol in semi-honest and malicious (straightforward) models. This does not lead to a conclusion that evaluating the secure dot product protocol in malicious model is totally unusable and inapplicable; in Figure 1 we also show that the overall running time in malicious model can be reduced to a half by slightly modifying the protocol in favor of the malicious model. It is possible that more sophisticated methods and modifications may lead to bigger increases in efficiency. Moreover, implementing the protocol by using generic circuit evaluation methods [11] is not feasible at all: The generated circuit should be duplicated as many as the size of the dataset, because the secure dot product protocol 
Secure Comparison and Equality Check
Referring to famous Millionaires problem [17] secure comparison is an important and commonly used primitive in privacy-preserving data mining applications. In the basic secure comparison protocol two values are compared to output <, > or = without revealing the values. It is mainly used as a primitive in more complex algorithms such as sorting, finding median or mean among a group of elements. Meanwhile, secure equality check is a special case of the secure comparison protocol.
For both primitives, as the number of inputs is fixed (2) the bit-length of the inputs play more important role on the efficiency. Especially in generic circuit evaluation techniques, input length is a deterministic factor. In this section, we implement and then compare 3 different versions of the secure equality check protocol. The results are displayed in Figure 2 ; from which it can be observed that there is no significant difference between semi-honest and malicious models and our solution using the malicious model is superior to circuit evaluation. 
Set Union and Intersection
As it was explained in Section III-C the set intersection protocol can easily be converted into and implemented as a secure dot product. In addition to this, in the set intersection protocol the inputs for secure dot product are specially bit vectors which allow parties to skip the multiplications of 0s in their shares (i.e. the elements in the domain that they do not have). This property provides more efficient results than the regular secure dot product especially when the bit vectors are sparse.
On the other hand, secure set union protocol is a combination of secure dot product and secure equality. Both set union and intersection protocols are dependent on the input size which is the size of the input domain in this case.
Privacy-Preserving K-means Clustering Algorithm using Arbitrarily Partitioned Data
The secure dot product and secure comparison protocols are very frequently used primitives in privacy-preserving k-means clustering algorithm that is defined in [7] . According to [7] secure dot products are mainly used for calculating cluster centers where the input size for the secure dot products is proportional to the number of attributes (l) in the partitioned data. Also the total number of secure dot products can be estimated in terms of number of clusters (k) which is a relatively small number (usually <20). Being independent of the size of the database (n) the overall cost of secure dot products in privacy-preserving k-means clustering algorithm can be estimated as O(k*l) [7] . In contrast to some other applications such as Association Rule Mining where the input size for secure dot products are a factor of the size of the data, in privacy-preserving k-means clustering with such small k and l secure dot products in malicious model is efficient enough to be usable.
Conclusions
Most of the privacy-preserving data mining algorithms in the literature were developed using the semi-honest model; which relies on the presumption that all participating parties would follow the protocol without producing any harm or threat for others. Although this assumption may be accurate for some cases, there are many real-life examples where more strict statements should be made. The malicious model introduces solid rules for security with the cost of loss of efficiency. However, the trade-off between semi-honest and malicious models is not clear in practice. In this study, using the standard primitive algorithms in the semi-honest model (secure dot product, comparison, and set intersection) we first provide ways for developing them in malicious model with the help of threshold decryption and zero knowledge proofs. Then we showed that these algorithms can further be improved in terms of efficiency by specializing them in malicious model. As an example we provide an efficient algorithm for secure dot product in malicious model. In the end we evaluated the performance of the algorithms in malicious model by comparing them with the ones in semi-honest model. We also included the performance analysis results of the circuit evaluation versions as a benchmark; thus showing the superiority of our methods. Finally, we discussed usability and applicability of the primitive algorithms in malicious model when they are used within larger applications such as privacy-preserving k-means clustering and association rule mining.
